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Abstract 
Feminism is rarely used as a theoretical framework for couple finance research. The purposes of 
the present paper are (a) to discuss couple finance research in the context of feminism to 
encourage more frequent and explicit use of feminism in couple finance research, (b) to present a 
gender and couple finances model, and (c) to test this model with longitudinal dyadic data. Using 
actor-partner interdependence models (APIM) and data from 327 U.S. mixed-gender couples, 
relational power was explored as a potential mediator between four couple financial processes 
(earners of money, access to money, management of money, and conflict about money) and two 
relationship outcomes (relationship quality and relationship stability). Results suggest that couple 
financial processes are associated with relationship outcomes and with joint management as well 
as low conflict being key longitudinally. Additionally, although power may not play a mediating 
role, it appears to be connected to couple financial processes and relationship outcomes 
concurrently. Gender differences as well as both actor and partner effects are explored. This 
research has implications for researchers, clinicians, and educators. For example, clinicians may 
want to encourage their clients to use joint bank accounts, manage their money jointly, and 
minimize financial conflict. Gender, and therefore power, are inseparably tied to couple finances. 
When both spouses are involved in financial processes, partners tend to be more empowered, and 
relationship quality and stability tend to be higher. 
 Keywords: feminism; couple finance; power; family finance; gender equality; 
relationship quality; relationship stability; income; bank accounts; money management; financial 
conflict 
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Feminism and Couple Finance:  
Power as a Mediator Between Financial Processes and Relationship Outcomes 
 In recent reviews on finances among mixed-gender couples, Dew (2008, 2016) stressed 
the need for a greater understanding of the interactions between gender and financial power in 
romantic relationships. Although gender is inherently part of all research on couple finance, 
issues such as power, privilege, and inequality are rarely part of the discourse. Even when they 
are, feminism is rarely used as an explicit theoretical basis, although feminist ideas and 
assumptions are implicitly discussed. What are we missing by failing to explicitly study couple 
finance using a feminist lens? A feminist approach is valuable in this case because it sheds light 
on potential power and privilege imbalances based on gender, and it makes space for candid 
discussion of these inequalities. Feminist reflections on couple financial processes may aid in 
eliminating the inequality some women experience in their relationships. The purposes of the 
present paper are (a) to discuss couple finance research in the context of feminism to encourage 
more frequent and explicit use of feminism in couple finance research, (b) to present a gender 
and couple finances model, and (c) to test this model with longitudinal dyadic data.  
Theoretical Foundation 
 Feminism consists of a wide variety of views and frameworks (Roy & Mitchell, 2015). In 
the current paper we address feminism broadly and present a representative compilation of the 
most established perspectives. Allen and Jaramillo-Sierra (2015) present four key elements of 
feminism. First, gender matters, and power differences generally exist between the genders. 
Typically, men have more power and privilege than women do (Beckman, 2014). Second, 
gender is socially constructed, making it—as well as gender inequality—subject to continual 
change. Third, gender inequality is damaging to societies, families, and individuals. Fourth, 
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  4 
 
efforts should be made to eradicate gender inequality (Beckman, 2014; Doucet & Lee, 2014). In 
short, “the point of feminist scholarship and activism is to draw attention to the dialectics of 
oppression and privilege and to spark empowering strategies, both individually and collectively, 
to change such disempowering conditions” (Allen & Jaramillo-Sierra, 2015, p. 94). By 
highlighting issues of power, privilege, and inequality, feminism can contextualize and add 
meaning to couple finance research. 
Feminist research is unique in that it values and embraces subjectivity and reflexivity on 
the part of both the researcher and the participants (Barone-Chapman, 2013; Beckman, 2014). “A 
new generation of feminist scholars are unapologetically engaging their own experience in 
claiming a feminist perspective in theory, research, and activism” (Allen, 2016, p. 209). The first 
two authors’ experiences as women have shaped their decisions around both family and work 
life. As educated, White women in the 21st century, we enjoy privilege and power unheard of by 
women experiencing different intersectionalities. We acknowledge this point and take our 
privilege very seriously. 
 Unfortunately, few studies on mixed-gender couple finance draw explicitly upon feminist 
theory. To begin filling this gap, we review research on four couple financial processes—earners 
of money, access to money, management of money, and conflict about money—through a 
feminist lens in order to illustrate the relevance and value of feminism to couple finance 
research. We also briefly review literature on the association between relational power and 
relationship outcomes. 
Earners of Money 
Gender matters in family finance. Finance scholars typically assess who earns the money 
in the family by asking questions like: Is the family a single-earner or dual-earner household? 
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Which earner is considered the “primary” breadwinner? An intuitive relationship exists between 
bringing money into a marriage and having power within that marriage, particularly financial 
power (Pahl, 1995; Rodman, 1972). Qualitative research has shown that female breadwinners 
enjoy increased control and power that comes with earning (Meisenbach, 2010). Money typically 
provides power, influence, freedom, and privilege—concepts that are key to feminist discourse. 
Wives’ financial dependence on their husbands can perpetuate abuse and other aspects of 
unhealthy relationships (Barnett & LaViolette, 1993). Ironically, however, some research 
suggests that female breadwinners may be abused more often than housewives (Atkinson, 
Greenstein, & Lang, 2005). It may be that a wife’s employment can threaten a husband’s 
hegemonic masculinity (Nock, 1998; Smithson, Lewis, Cooper, & Dyer, 2004; see Curran, 
McDaniel, Pollitt, & Totenhagen, 2015, for discussion of hegemonic masculinity in romantic 
relationships). In any case, money appears central to the unequal balance of power in marriage. 
Who earns what money is related to other gendered dynamics in families. In developed 
societies, more and more women are employed (Meisenbach, 2010). Although the majority 
(61.7%) of American women now work outside the home, 21.7% of American households still 
employ the traditional male breadwinner model (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). Employed women 
may still feel more responsible than employed men do for tasks associated with childcare and 
housework (Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, & Matheson, 2003; Meisenbach, 2010; Roy & 
Mitchell, 2015). Additionally, a gender pay gap exists. Stereotypically feminine jobs garner 
lower wages than stereotypically masculine ones. Women who choose motherhood face a 
motherhood wage penalty whereas men who choose fatherhood do not typically face a 
fatherhood penalty (England, Bearak, Budig, & Hodges, 2016), and in some professions 
women’s wages are still lower than men’s despite the fact that they work the same jobs (Roy & 
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Mitchell, 2015; Smithson et al., 2004). Further, gender differences in the use of work flexibility 
may reinforce the gender pay gap (Smithson et al., 2004). That being said, all gender differences 
do not advantage men. Some research suggests that wives receive more praise than husbands do 
in regard to earnings. For example, absolute income is associated with husbands’ gratitude to 
wives, but for husbands, only income relative to their wives is associated with wives’ gratitude 
(Deutsch, Roksa, & Meeske, 2003).  
These findings illustrate that gender matters in family finance. Inequality and privilege as 
features of earnings ought to be explicitly addressed, particularly as they relate to the social 
construction of roles that men and women take on in families. Explicitly addressing inequality 
and privilege implies that women’s efforts to contribute to the family’s finances may not be as 
fruitful as men’s in current workplace climates. 
Access to Money 
Feminist theory sensitizes one to an imbalance of power within societies and teaches that 
this imbalance is generated by patriarchal hegemony (Komter, 1989; Tichenor, 1999). In this 
hierarchy, money and power are often synonymous; those with access to money tend to have 
more power than do those without it and these divisions are often gendered (Tichenor, 1999). 
Because individual relationships are imbedded in these patriarchal structures, the way couples 
manage finances, including who has access to money, likely reflects larger ideological views 
(Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Vogler, 1998; Vogler & Pahl, 1994). 
In this vein, couple finance scholars often explore partners’ access to money by 
examining use of joint versus separate bank accounts. Married couples are more likely than 
cohabiting couples are to use joint accounts (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; Oropesa, Landale, 
& Kenkre, 2003). In more egalitarian countries such as Sweden, however, higher income and age 
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  7 
 
are associated with keeping finances separate (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003). Further, Heimdal 
and Houseknecht (2003) found that gender role ideology impacts access to money. For example, 
in the United States, couples in dual-income marriages were more likely to keep their money 
separate than were those in marriages in which only the man works, but marriages in which only 
the woman works did not differ from dual-income marriages in this regard. Further exploration 
of the reason for this trend revealed that the majority of the men in female-breadwinner 
relationships were still contributing income via unemployment and retirement benefits, whereas 
90% of the women in male-breadwinner relationships were housewives (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003).  
Feminist issues are at the core of access to financial resources in marriage. Although 
Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) noted that perceptions of relationship stability impacted 
partners’ access to money, they did not use a feminist lens to interpret their findings. We suggest 
that those with less security in their relationship may find power through independent access to 
finances. The least secure relationships were those most likely to keep separate bank accounts in 
samples in both Sweden and the United States (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003). 
It is also interesting that joint bank accounts are more likely to occur in a male-
breadwinning marriage than in a female-breadwinning or dual-income marriage (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003). Research shows that one spouse having greater access to resources than the 
other can enable marital inequality (Pahl, 1995). Thus, it seems as though, overall, men may be 
disadvantaged in terms of access to money. Specifically, in male-breadwinning marriages, both 
the husband and wife generally have access to funds. On the other hand, in female-breadwinning 
marriages, the husband may have less access to the wife’s account. Because women have 
historically been the disadvantaged gender, feminism has focused primarily on disadvantages for 
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women. However, feminists are also concerned with any inequalities toward men (Beckman, 
2014). Thus, a feminist-based discussion as to why men seem to be disadvantaged in their access 
to money in some situations would be valuable. 
Management of Money 
Financial management is key to the study of couple finance. Researchers often identify 
heterosexual couples based on whether the man or woman manages the money or if they co-
manage. Although women are more likely to experience general financial inequality in the sense 
of financial sacrifices and personal spending money, the type of management style couples use is 
a great predictor of this inequality (Pahl, 1995). Research has shown that financial management 
by one spouse, whether by the husband or the wife, disadvantages the wife. Male-management 
seems to encourage male privilege in that the husband has more say in decision-making and 
more personal spending money. On the other hand, female-management seems to encourage 
greater financial sacrifice (e.g., cuts in spending on food and clothes) and less personal spending 
money for the wife. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon may be that women are more 
likely to spend money on the family than on themselves (Pahl, 1995). Either way, management 
by one spouse seems to disadvantage the wife (Pahl, 1995; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). The greatest 
financial equality occurs when finances are held in a joint account and are co-managed. 
However, only approximately 20% of couples employ these methods (i.e., joint account and co-
management; Pahl, 1995). Dual-income marriages are more likely to employ shared financial 
management techniques than single-income marriages (Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Further, the 
more the wife contributes to the family’s income, the more financial decision-making power she 
is likely to have within the marriage (Bernasek & Bajtelsmit, 2002). 
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The way a couple manages their finances is a good indicator of the equality in their 
relationship (Pahl, 1995; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Research suggests that husbands’ control over 
families’ finances exacerbates inequalities already produced by income gaps, putting wives in 
even severer positions of powerlessness (Kenney, 2006). Further, the fact that wives are 
disadvantaged in both male-managed and female-managed systems (Pahl, 1995) begs feminist 
discussions of gender inequality. Clearly, gender is central to the relationship between power and 
financial management in mixed-gender couples. A discussion of the finding that financial 
equality is most likely to occur in cases of co-managed, joint accounts (Pahl, 1995) would be 
fascinating using a feminist lens. 
Conflict about Money  
Financial conflict has been shown to predict marital dissatisfaction (Archuleta, Britt, 
Tonn, & Grable, 2011; Conger, Rueter, & Elder, 1999; Dew, 2011; Gudmunson, Beutler, 
Israelsen, McCoy, & Hill, 2007; Hill, Allsop, LeBaron, & Bean, 2017) and divorce (Albrecht, 
1979; Amato & Rogers, 1997; Dew, Britt, & Huston, 2012). Conflict often arises from 
differences in financial values and attitudes (Britt, Hill, LeBaron, Lawson, & Bean, 2017; Siegel, 
1990). Research has also begun to explore how power and even coercion are involved in couple 
financial decision-making (Su, Fern, & Ye, 2003). Dew (2008) recently called for more research 
dedicated to the intricacies of couples’ communication about finances. 
 When there is conflict, power and privilege often play lead roles. Examining financial 
conflict processes and outcomes through a feminist lens could shed light on the specific roles 
power and privilege are playing in financial communication within mixed-gender marriages. 
Perhaps gender influences not only the values and attitudes central to financial conflict (Siegel, 
1990) but also the ways in which conflicting values are given importance over each other. For 
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example, Latino couples experience less financial conflict due to more established gender roles 
which favor men for financial management (Falicov, 2001); this could suggest that although low 
financial conflict is usually linked with healthy couple processes and positive couple outcomes, 
sometimes low financial conflict might be the result of unequal money management or an 
imbalance of power. A feminist-based investigation into the relationship between clarity and 
distinctness of gender roles and financial conflict (Falicov, 2001) could give insight into the 
ways financial communication in marriage impacts marital satisfaction (e.g., Archuleta et al., 
2011) and stability (e.g., Dew et al., 2012). 
Relational Power and Relationship Outcomes 
 There are many ways to assess relationships, but two core approaches include studying 
relationship quality and relationship stability (Amato, Booth, Johnson, & Rogers, 2007; Busby, 
Holman, & Taniguchi, 2001). These are correlated but separate constructs. Relationship quality 
refers to one’s personal assessment of their relationship: is it positive or is it negative (Farooqi, 
2014)? Some commonly assessed aspects of relationship quality include intimacy (e.g., Conroy 
et al., 2016), trust, (e.g., Gottman, 2011), communication (Byrne, Carr, & Clark, 2004), 
satisfaction (e.g., Oyamot, Fuglestad, & Snyder, 2010), validation (Greenberg & Goldman, 
2008), empathy, and teamwork (e.g., Knudson-Martin, 2013). 
Relationship stability refers to the capacity and desire to maintain one’s relationship over 
time (Amato et al., 2007; Busby et al., 2001). Gender becomes critical to relationship quality and 
stability because a woman’s assessment of relationship quality is more likely to be correlated 
with relationship stability than a man’s (Lawrence et al., 2008; Pasch & Bradbury, 1998). 
Greater instability is associated with lower commitment and a higher likelihood of dissolution 
(Arriaga, 2001). 
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Past research provides evidence that balanced relational power is associated with positive 
relationship quality (Conroy et al., 2016), whereas an imbalance of relational power tends to 
predict negative relationship quality (Byrne et al., 2004; Oyamot et al., 2010). For example, 
Conroy et al. (2016) found that shared power was positively associated with four domains of 
relationship quality (intimacy, trust, mutually constructive communication, and conflict). When 
both partners feel empowered, they are also more likely to engage in relationship practices that 
foster equality and security such as building trust (Gottman, 2011), validating each other 
(Greenberg & Goldman, 2008), and demonstrating empathy and teamwork (see Knudson-Martin, 
2013, for a comprehensive review). This positive association between relational power and 
relationship quality can even be seen in adolescents’ romantic relationships: adolescents who felt 
they had equal or greater relational power compared to their partner experienced more intimate 
relationships than those who felt they had less power than their partner did (Bay-Cheng, Maguin, 
& Bruns, 2018).  
However, although high relational power seems to bode well for relationships, power 
imbalances are associated with lower relationship quality and commitment (Lennon, Stewart, & 
Ledermann, 2013), attachment insecurity (Oka, Brown, & Miller, 2016), and wives’ greater 
physiological and psychological reactivity due to their lower status and power in relationships 
(Wanic & Kulik, 2011). This suggests that having both partners report high relational power is 
important, and positive relational effects may be contingent on this balance. 
Relational Power as a Mediator 
 Cromwell and Olsen (1975) conceptualize relational power as the level of influence one 
has over another, and they urge scholars to assess relational power in economic terms. Wanic 
and Kulik (2011) build on this conceptualization by acknowledging that relational power is often 
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psychological and represents an individual’s perception that s/he can influence relational 
processes and, consequently, relational outcomes. Both scholars stress that relational power is an 
interdependent construct, meaning that our assessments of power (both conscious and 
subconscious) occur in relation to another person. Based on these conceptualizations, our 
literature review has focused on how a mixed-gender couple’s financial strategies such as 
earning money, access to money, money management, and conflict about money may be 
associated with relational power. We have also addressed how relational power has been 
associated with specific relationship outcomes such as features of quality and stability. With 
money as a core symbol of power, and with its linkage to relationship stability and relationship 
quality across different cultural contexts, we suggest that earning money, having access to 
money, money management, and conflict about money may all be connected to perceptions of 
relational power. It is through these perceptions of relational power that the couple’s financial 
lives will be indirectly associated with relationship quality and relationship stability. 
The Current Study  
Combining a feminist approach with established research, we present a gender and 
couple finances model. We propose that relationship quality and stability are positively 
influenced by both partners’ relational power. Because money is symbolic of power, perhaps 
equity in financial processes leads to empowerment. Thus, we posit that couple financial 
processes predict relationship outcomes through relational power. In the present study, we test 
this model with longitudinal (three-wave), dyadic data using actor-partner interdependence 
models (APIM). Longitudinal data captures change and therefore lends itself to understanding 
processes that develop across time much more so than cross-sectional data (where development 
can only be inferred). The significance of using dyadic data—both men’s and women’s reports—
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should not be overlooked. Patriarchy questions the value or uniqueness of women’s experience, 
particularly when male privilege or power may be at stake (Beckman, 2014; Roy & Mitchell, 
2015). To address this point, we call attention to women’s experiences as important sources of 
knowledge and catalysts for change (Beckman, 2014). It is possible that when there is only one 
report for relational indicators, the woman’s voice may be suppressed. Dyadic data allows both 
partners’ voices to both be fully heard. 
While conducting our review, we discovered that the empirical research on relational 
power is limited in three important ways. First, much of the literature uses non-probability 
community samples. Second, it focuses on only wives’ perspectives, therefore it does not assess 
relational power as an interdependent construct. Third, very little is known about whether or not 
associations between relational power and relationship quality or stability occur over time 
(please see LeBaron, Miller, & Yorgason, 2014, for an exception). One of the strengths of our 
paper is the ability to improve the literature by addressing all three of these limitations. 
In connection with the gender and couple finances model, we propose the following three 
hypotheses. (a) Four couple financial processes will predict relationship quality and stability 
(Hypothesis 1). Specifically, we expect that income, joint bank accounts, and joint management 
will be positively associated with relationship outcomes, and conflict will be negatively 
associated with relationship outcomes. We hypothesize both actor and partner effects, cross-
sectionally and longitudinally. (b) Relational power will mediate links between couple financial 
processes and relationship outcomes (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, we hypothesize that income, 
joint bank accounts, and joint management will be positively associated with power, and conflict 
will be negatively associated with power. Subsequently, we hypothesize that higher reports of 
power will be positively associated with relationship outcomes. We hypothesize both actor and 
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partner effects, cross-sectionally and longitudinally. (c) Based on gender differences in ways that 
finances are linked with power and relationship outcomes in the established literature, we expect 
to find gender differences in our study (Hypothesis 3). Prior literature might suggest stronger 
associations among key variables in our study for women than for men, including involvement of 
partner effects. Alternatively, from a feminist perspective, men in disadvantaged positions may 
have similar experiences to women in such circumstances. Thus, although we expect gender 
differences, our hypothesis is not directional. 
Method 
Participants 
 The sample for our study was selected from Waves 1–4 of the Flourishing Families 
Project (FFP). The FFP is a 10-wave longitudinal study of U.S. family life involving families 
with a child between the ages of 10 and 14 at Wave 1. Our study consisted of 500 (163 single-
parent and 337 mixed-gender, two-parent) families at Wave 1, with a 94% retention rate at Wave 
4 (n = 469, 149 single-parent and 320 two-parent families). Only couples who reported being 
married (n = 323 couples) or cohabiting (n = 4 couples) were included; thus, the final sample for 
our paper included 327 couples (n = 654 individuals). 
The majority of the sample was White (Women: 270, 83%; Men: 286, 87%). Based on 
women’s reports at Wave 2, almost two-thirds (207, 63%) of couples had been together between 
11 and 20 years (M = 18.31, SD = 4.81). The average age of women was 44.41 (SD = .32, range 
= 29–60) and the average age of men was 46.25 (SD = .34, range = 28–63). The sample had 
above-average income, with men’s income being higher, on average, than women’s income. For 
women, 96 (29%) reported an annual income of less than $20,000, 70 (21%) reported between 
$20,000 and $39,999, 57 (17%) reported between $40,000 and $59,999, 45 (14%) reported 
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between $60,000 and $99,999, and 33 (10%) reported $100,000 or more. For men, 11 (3%) 
reported an annual income of less than $20,000, 23 (7%) reported between $20,000 and $39,999, 
50 (15%) reported between $40,000 and $59,999, 119 (36%) reported between $60,000 and 
$99,999, and 99 (30%) reported $100,000 or more. In terms of highest education level 
completed, 19 (6%) women reported less than high school or high school, 69 (21%) reported 
some college, 146 (45%) reported Associate’s or Bachelor’s, and 93 (28%) reported Master’s or 
Advanced degrees. For men, 21 (6%) reported less than high school or high school, 64 (20%) 
reported some college, 139 (43%) reported Associate’s or Bachelor’s, and 101 (31%) reported 
Master’s or Advanced degrees. 
Procedure 
Participant families for the FFP were selected from a large U.S. northwestern city. 
Although data collection involved both video-recorded interviews and questionnaires, we used 
only the questionnaire data in the current study. For Wave 1, data collection occurred during the 
first 8 months of 2007. Subsequent waves were collected at yearly intervals (Wave 2 = 2008, 
Wave 3 = 2009, Wave 4 = 2010). Families were primarily recruited using a purchased national 
telephone survey database (Polk Directories/InfoUSA). This database claimed to have detailed 
information of about 82 million households across the United States. Families identified using 
the Polk Directory were randomly selected from targeted census tracts that mirrored the socio-
economic and racial stratification of local school districts. At Wave 1, all families with a child 
between the ages of 10 and 14 living within target census tracts were deemed eligible to 
participate in the FFP. Of the 692 eligible families contacted, 423 agreed to participate, resulting 
in a 61% response rate. An additional 77 families (15%) were recruited using other means (e.g., 
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referrals, fliers) in order to more closely mirror the demographics of the local area and increase 
the socio-economic and ethnic diversity of the sample. 
Measures 
 Our study employed items and scales from the FFP to measure financial processes, 
relational power, and relationship outcomes. Control variables included relationship length 
(reported in years) and race (White = 0; Other = 1). Age was not included as a control variable 
due to its collinearity with relationship length. Both women’s and men’s reports were utilized for 
all measures, with the exception of relationship length (only women’s report). All variables were 
measured at Wave 2, with the exception of race (which was measured at Wave 1). Additionally, 
in order to test longitudinal mediation, relational power and relationship outcomes were 
measured at Wave 3, and relationship outcomes were also measured at Wave 4. 
Couple financial processes. To measure earners of money, respondents were asked, 
“What is your present annual income (not including your partner’s wages)?” Response categories 
ranged from 1 (under $10,000 per year) to 12 ($200,000 or more per year), with higher values 
representing higher income. The item, “Do you and your partner have separate household 
checking accounts?,” was used to measure access to money. Originally, participants responded 
yes (1) or no (2), but the item was recoded so that separate accounts = 0, joint accounts = 1. To 
measure management of money, respondents were asked: “How often do you and your spouse 
work household financial challenges as a team?” Participants responded on a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (seldom—less than one time per month) to 4 (constantly—usually every day), 
with higher scores indicating more joint management. Conflict about money was measured using 
the following item: “How often are financial matters a problem in your relationship?” 
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  17 
 
Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often), with 
higher scores indicating more conflict. 
Relational power. The Couple Power scale (Wave 2: αwomen = .92, αmen = .92; Wave 3: 
αwomen =.92, αmen =.93) was used to measure relational power. The scale included 15 items such 
as “My partner tends to discount my opinion” (reverse coded) and “I feel like I have no choice 
but to do what my partner wants” (reserve coded). All items were measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and 13 items were reverse coded 
so that higher scores indicated higher power. The scale was adapted from Ball, Cowan, and 
Cowan (1995); Crosbie-Burnett and Giles-Sims (1999); Lindahl, Malik, Kaczynski, and Simons 
(2004); and Sagrestano, Christopher, and Christensen (1999). The full list of items can be found 
in Table 1s (available in the online supplement). 
Relationship quality. The Couple Relationship Quality scale (Wave 2: αwomen = .98, αmen 
= .97; Wave 3: αwomen = .98, αmen = .97; Wave 4: αwomen = .97, αmen = .97) was used to measure 
relationship quality. The scale included five items: “We have a good relationship,” “My 
relationship with my partner is very stable,” “Our relationship is strong,” “My relationship with 
my partner makes me happy,” and “I really feel like part of a team with my partner.” All items 
were measured on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6 (very 
strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater quality (Norton, 1983). 
Relationship stability. The Couple Instability scale (Wave 2: αwomen = .76, αmen = .76; 
Wave 3: αwomen = .69, αmen = .67; Wave 4: αwomen = .73, αmen = .67) was used to measure 
relationship stability. The scale included three items: “How often have you thought your 
relationship (or marriage) might be in trouble?,” “How often have you and your partner 
discussed ending your relationship (or marriage)?,” and “How often have you broken up or 
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  18 
 
separated and then gotten back together?” All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often), and all items were reverse coded so that higher scores 
indicated greater stability (Busby et al., 2001). 
Data Analysis Plan 
 As preliminary analyses, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of all study 
variables were estimated. In order to test the hypotheses, analyses were conducted in a three-step 
process. First, measurement models in SEM were created to examine factor loadings and model 
fit of latent constructs. Then, both non-mediation and mediation cross-sectional structural 
equation models (SEM) were estimated to test direct and indirect effects at Wave 2. SEM modes 
were estimated using Mplus Version 7 software to test mediation with latent constructs. Finally, 
both non-mediation and mediation longitudinal SEMs (testing mediation for women and for 
men) were estimated to test direct and indirect effects over time. For all models, missing data 
(between 5% and 15% for all variables) were handled using the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method, comparable to multiple imputation (Newman, 2003). FIML allows 
missing data on model outcomes but does not include cases missing on model predictors. 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
Descriptive statistics were estimated across gender and can be found in Table 1. For 
detailed information on earners of money, see the income description in the Method section. In 
terms of access to money, 81% of women and 79% of men reported having joint bank accounts. 
In regard to management of money, the mean response tended toward higher levels of joint 
management. Mean responses for conflict about money tended toward somewhat frequent 
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conflict. Reports of relational power and relationship quality and stability tended toward higher 
levels of power, quality, and stability. 
Bivariate Correlations 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were estimated to gauge bivariate relationships between 
variables. (See Table 2 for select correlations; a comprehensive table of correlations can be 
found in Table 2s in the online supplement.) Relationship quality, stability, and power were 
significantly, positively related with each other, both between women’s and men’s reports and 
across time. Additionally, all financial processes except women’s income were significantly 
associated with relationship quality and stability, with income, access, and management having 
positive associations and conflict having negative associations. Access and management were 
positively related to relational power, whereas conflict was negatively related to relational 
power. 
Measurement Models 
First, two measurement models were estimated, with relationship quality and stability as 
latent constructs in separate models. In both models, latent variables were included for both 
women and men at Waves 2, 3, and 4. As reported in Table 3s (available in the online 
supplement), all factor loadings were above .40. Acceptable model fit (Little, 2013) was 
achieved with a CFI > .90 and a RMSEA < .08. Model fit for the relationship quality model 
suggested that the model fit the data well: χ2(705) = 1103.72, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04. 
Model fit for the relationship stability model was less ideal, although still acceptable: χ2(273) = 
827.924, p < .001, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .08. 
Structural Models 
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Due to a relatively small sample size compared to the number of parameters estimated in 
the model, relational power was measured using latent factor scores, and relationship quality and 
stability were examined separately in all models. A total of eight structural models were 
estimated (one each for relationship outcome): two cross-sectional non-mediation models, two 
cross-sectional mediation models, two longitudinal non-mediation models, and two longitudinal 
mediation models. All models were constructed as APIMs. We first tested Hypothesis 1 (non-
mediation effects), after which we tested Hypothesis 2 (mediation effects). Hypothesis 3 (gender 
differences) was tested throughout. 
Hypothesis 1: Non-mediation models. First, cross-sectional and longitudinal non-
mediation models were estimated and direct effects were explored. In the cross-sectional models, 
regression paths were estimated with income, bank account, financial teamwork, and financial 
conflict predicting relationship quality and stability. Race and relationship length were controlled 
in all models. All variables were measured at Wave 2, with the exception of race (which was 
measured at Wave 1). All independent variables and controls were correlated with each other. 
Male and female latent outcome variables were also correlated with each other, as were the male 
and female indicators, to account for non-independence.  
In the longitudinal models, the financial processes were examined at Wave 2, and the 
relationship outcomes were examined at Wave 4. We controlled for relationship quality and 
stability at Wave 3. Regression paths were estimated from the four financial processes and the 
controls (including the outcome variables at Wave 3) to relationship quality and stability (Wave 
4). 
Relationship quality: Cross-sectional model. For the (non-mediation) cross-sectional 
model predicting relationship quality, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit the data 
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  21 
 
well (Little, 2013): χ2(117) = 198.41, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05. The model predicted 
16% of the variance in relationship quality for women and 26% for men. In terms of effects, 
men’s report of management was positively associated with female quality, and women’s report 
of conflict was negatively associated with female quality. Male income, female access, female 
management, and male management were positively associated with male quality, and male 
conflict was negatively associated with male quality. All direct effects for the relationship quality 
structural models can be seen in Table 3a. 
Relationship stability: Cross-sectional model. For the (non-mediation) cross-sectional 
model predicting relationship stability, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit the data 
well (Little, 2013): χ2(49) = 93.84, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05. The model predicted 24% 
of the variance in relationship stability for women and 28% for men. In terms of effects, female 
management and male management were positively associated with female stability, and female 
conflict was negatively associated with female stability. Female access and male management 
were positively associated with male stability, and male conflict was negatively associated with 
male stability. All direct effects for the relationship stability structural models can be seen in 
Table 4a. 
Relationship quality—longitudinal model. For the (non-mediation) longitudinal model 
predicting relationship quality, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit was acceptable 
(Little, 2013): χ2 (334) = 535.48, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04. The model predicted 45% 
of the variance in relationship quality for women and 52% for men. In terms of effects, male 
quality at Wave 3 positively predicted female quality at Wave 4. Female management as well as 
female quality at Wave 3 positively predicted male quality at Wave 4. All direct effects for the 
relationship quality structural models can be seen in Table 3c. 
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Relationship stability—longitudinal model. For the (non-mediation) longitudinal model 
predicting relationship stability, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit was acceptable 
(Little, 2013): χ2 (124) = 389.32, p < .001, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .08. The model predicted 78% 
of the variance in relationship stability for women and 79% for men. In terms of effects, female 
management and female stability at Wave 3 positively predicted male stability at Wave 4, and 
male conflict negatively predicted it. All direct effects for the relationship stability structural 
models can be seen in Table 4c. 
Hypothesis 2: Mediation models. Next, cross-sectional and longitudinal mediation 
models were estimated and both direct and indirect effects were explored. All independent 
variables and controls predicted male and female reports of relational power, which subsequently 
predicted the dependent variables (see Figure 1). Thus, the models examined relational power as 
a mediator between couple financial processes and relationship outcomes. Both direct and 
indirect paths were estimated. To estimate appropriate standard errors of indirect effects, 5,000 
bootstraps were drawn.  
In the longitudinal mediation models, the financial processes were examined at Wave 2, 
relational power was examined at Wave 3, and the relationship outcomes were examined at 
Wave 4. We controlled for power at Wave 2 and relationship quality and stability at Wave 3. 
Regression paths were estimated from the four financial processes and the controls (including the 
outcome variables at Wave 3) to relationship quality and stability (Wave 4). As described by 
Jose (2016, p. 336), “including these covariates ensures that the IV [independent variable] 
predicts change in the mediator, and the mediator predicts change in the outcome.” All 
independent variables and controls (including power at Wave 2) predicted male and female 
reports of relational power (Wave 3), which subsequently predicted the dependent variables. This 
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method allowed us to test whether the influence of financial processes on relationship outcomes 
over time was significantly mediated by relational power (Jose, 2016). Specifically, mediation 
could be concluded if positive financial processes predicted an increase in relational power, 
which, in turn, predicted an increase in relationship quality and stability (Jose, 2016). 
Relationship quality: Cross-sectional model. For the (mediation) cross-sectional model 
predicting relationship quality, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit the data well 
(Little, 2013): χ2(134) = 241.23, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05. The model predicted 38% 
of the variance in relationship quality for women and 42% for men as well as 24% of the 
variance in relational power for women and 27% for men. As seen in Figure 1 and Table 3b, 
female access (Figure 1, pathway 1a), female management (pathway 1b), and male management 
(pathway 1b) were positively associated with female power, and female conflict (pathway 1c) 
was negatively associated with female power. Female management (pathway 1b) and male 
management (pathway 1b) were positively related to male power, and male conflict (pathway 1c) 
was negatively related to male power. Male income (pathway 1d), female power (pathway 1e), 
and male power (pathway 1e) were positively related to female quality. Male income (pathway 
1d), female management (pathway 1f), female power (pathway 1e), and male power (pathway 
1e) were positively associated with male quality. 
In terms of indirect effects, female access, female management, male management, and 
female conflict had significant indirect associations with female quality through female power. 
Female management and female conflict had indirect associations with male quality through 
female power. Female management, male management, and male conflict had indirect links to 
female quality through male power. Female management, male management, and male conflict 
had indirect links to male quality through male power. Together, the direct effects and indirect 
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effects from the cross-sectional relationship quality models suggest both actor- and partner-
associations in relational power as a mediator between financial processes (particularly access, 
management, and conflict) and relationship quality at the same time point. 
Relationship stability: Cross-sectional model. For the (mediation) cross-sectional model 
predicting relationship stability, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit the data well 
(Little, 2013): χ2(58) = 175.48, p < .001, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .08). The model predicted 47% of 
the variance for women and 46% for men as well as 24% of the variance in relational power for 
women and 27% for men. As seen in Figure 2 and Table 4b, female access (Figure 2, pathway 
2a), female management (pathway 2b), and male management (pathway 2b) were positively 
associated with female power, and female conflict (pathway 2c) was negatively associated with 
female power. Female management (pathway 2b) and male management (pathway 2b) were 
positively related to male power, and male conflict (pathway 2c) was negatively related to male 
power. Male income (pathway 2d), female power (pathway 2e), and male power (pathway 2e) 
were positively related to female stability, and female conflict (pathway 2f) was negatively 
related to female stability. Female power (pathway 2e) and male power (pathway 2e) were 
positively associated with male stability. 
In terms of indirect effects, female access, female management, male management, and 
female conflict had significant indirect associations with female stability through female power. 
Female management, male management, and female conflict were indirectly related to male 
stability through female power. Male management had an indirect link with female stability 
through male power. Male management and male conflict had indirect links with male stability 
through male power. Together, the direct effects and indirect effects from the cross-sectional 
relationship stability models suggest both actor- and partner-associations in relational power as a 
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mediator between financial processes (particularly access, management, and conflict) and 
relationship stability at the same time point. 
Relationship quality: Longitudinal model. For the (mediation) longitudinal model 
predicting relationship quality, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit was acceptable 
(Little, 2013): χ2 (403) = 636.74, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04. The model predicted 47% 
of the variance in relationship quality for women and 52% for men as well as 61% of the 
variance in relational power for women and 56% for men. As seen in Table 3d, male access at 
Wave 2 positively predicted male power at Wave 3, and female access negatively predicted it. 
Female and male power at Wave 3 positively predicted female quality at Wave 4. Female 
management, male power at Wave 3, and female quality at Wave 3 positively predicted male 
quality at Wave 4. There were no significant indirect associations between predictors and female 
or male quality longitudinally through relational power. 
Relationship stability: Longitudinal model. For the (mediation) longitudinal model 
predicting relationship stability, model fit statistics suggested that the model fit was acceptable 
(Little, 2013): χ2 (161) = 499.59, p < .001, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .08. The model predicted 78% 
of the variance for women and 77% for men as well as 61% of the variance in relational power 
for women and 56% for men. As seen in Table 4d, male access positively predicted male power 
at Wave 3, and female access negatively predicted it. There were no significant direct effects on 
female or male stability at Wave 4. There were also no significant indirect effects on female or 
male stability longitudinally.  
Together, the direct effects and lack of indirect effects from the longitudinal models 
suggest that although the associations between financial processes, relational power, and 
relationship outcomes are not necessarily longitudinal, these constructs do seem to be 
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connected—especially at the same time point. There is some evidence that power may be part of 
the concurrent explanation for the connection between financial processes and relationship 
outcomes. 
Discussion 
 Feminism is rarely used as a theoretical framework for couple finance research. The 
present study is one of the first explicit uses of feminism in couple finance research and one of 
the first to explore the relational impact of various financial processes together in the same 
model. Using actor-partner interdependence models (APIM) in a relatively large sample of 
longitudinal, dyadic data, we explored relational power as a potential mediator between four 
couple financial processes (earners of money, access to money, management of money, and 
conflict about money) and two relationship outcomes (relationship quality and relationship 
stability). Overall, our results demonstrate that feminism can be a productive theoretical 
framework through which to study couple finance. We found that although power may not play a 
mediating role, it appears to be connected to couple financial processes and relationship 
outcomes concurrently. Specifically, we tested three hypotheses informed by a feminist 
framework: Hypothesis 1: Couple financial processes will predict relationship quality and 
stability; Hypothesis 2: Relational power will mediate links between couple financial processes 
and relationship outcomes.; and Hypothesis 3: There will be gender differences. 
Hypothesis 1 was partially confirmed. In the cross-sectional non-mediation models, 
men’s report of management was positively associated with female quality, and women’s report 
of conflict was negatively associated with female quality. Male income, female access, female 
management, and male management were positively associated with male quality, and male 
conflict was negatively associated with male quality. Female management and male management 
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were positively associated with female stability, and female conflict was negatively associated 
with female stability. Female access and male management were positively associated with male 
stability, and male conflict was negatively associated with male stability. Longitudinally, female 
management at Wave 3 positively predicted male quality a year later at Wave 4. Additionally, 
female management at Wave 3 positively predicted male stability at Wave 4, and male conflict at 
Wave 3 negatively predicted it. Thus, several actor- and partner-associations in financial 
processes predicting relationship outcomes were found cross-sectionally. Further, joint 
management and low conflict continued to be significant, even longitudinally. 
 Hypothesis 2 was also partially confirmed. Together, the direct effects and indirect 
effects from all four cross-sectional models suggested both actor- and partner-associations in 
relational power as mediators between financial processes and relationship outcomes 
concurrently. For relationship quality, the path from income did not appear to be mediated, but 
those paths from access and conflict appeared to be fully mediated, and the effect from 
management appeared to be partially mediated. For relationship stability, the effects of 
management and conflict were partially mediated and that of access was fully mediated. 
Longitudinally, there were no significant indirect effects between predictors and female or male 
outcomes through relational power. Thus, relational power does seem to play a mediating role in 
the concurrent associations between couple financial processes and relationship outcomes. 
However, the role of power operating between finances and relationship outcomes does not seem 
to play out over time. Our lack of longitudinal mediation findings may be in part due to the 
relative stability of the outcome variables across time, especially in this sample where the 
average participant has been married nearly two decades and is thus less likely to have a low-
quality or low-stability marriage. Indeed, bivariate correlations (stability coefficients) between 
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waves of the outcome variables (same gender, same construct) were all between .61 and .82. In a 
sample of less stable, time-tested couples, perhaps power would mediate longitudinally. 
 Hypothesis 3 was also partially confirmed. For earners of money, male income predicted 
his own and his partner’s outcomes. We were surprised that female income did not predict 
female power (Meisenbach, 2010; Pahl, 1995; Rodman, 1972), nor did male income predict male 
power. However, male income was associated with both actor- and partner-relationship 
outcomes. This finding seems to be evidence for a continued cultural emphasis on men’s income 
and the importance of the male breadwinner role, despite the majority of U.S. women working 
outside the home (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). For access to money, the female report predicted 
her own and her partner’s power and outcomes. For management of money, we found many 
actor- and partner-associations cross-sectionally; further, the female report continued to predict 
her partner’s outcomes longitudinally. It is interesting that women’s reports of access and 
management were linked to relational consequences whereas men’s were not. This seems to be 
evidence for the importance of hearing about women’s experiences from their own mouths 
(Beckman, 2014). It is also interesting that men’s reports and women’s reports of whether or not 
they had separate bank accounts was not a perfect correlation; in fact, the correlation was only 
.79. It seems that some couples may not be on the same page financially, and it may be women’s 
perceptions of access to money that have relational consequences. For conflict about money, we 
found only actor effects and no obvious gender differences.  
Limitations 
 The sample consisted mainly of middle- to upper-class U.S. couples in stable marriages, 
and the results may be different for other samples of couples (particularly cohabiting couples). 
Additionally, all participating couples had a child between the ages of 10 and 14 at Wave 1, and 
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the results may be different for couples without children or with children of different ages. 
Perhaps relational power would be more predictive longitudinally with greater variations over 
time in relationship quality and stability. Additionally, we used single-item measures for 
exogenous variables. This may have impeded our ability to capture nuance, particularly in regard 
to management of money. Finally, relationship quality and relationship stability were estimated 
in separate models. 
Future Research Directions 
Despite its limitations, our study has implications for future research. Feminism is a 
valuable framework for mixed-gender couple finance research, and power is an important factor 
in how financial processes connect with relationship outcomes. The findings can be tied to Allen 
and Jaramillo-Sierra’s (2015) elements of feminism. For example, our findings indicate that 
gender does matter in mixed-gender couples, and spouses’ experiences of power differ. Our 
findings also support the notion that gender inequality (or low relational power) is damaging, 
including for relationship outcomes. Finally, efforts should indeed be made to eradicate gender 
inequality, and one way to do so may be to facilitate and encourage equity in financial processes 
between mixed-gender spouses.  
There is a need to use dyadic data and explore actor- and partner-effects in couple finance 
research so that both women’s and men’s voices and experiences can be heard, partly because 
their reports have sometimes differing relational impact. Further, intersectionality is an important 
component of feminism. We found that both men’s race and women’s race were significantly 
associated with female power cross-sectionally (in both the relationship stability and relationship 
quality models), as well as with female relationship quality longitudinally (in the relationship 
quality model). Specifically, the results suggested that the husband being White and the wife 
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being a Woman of Color may predict greater female relational power and greater female 
relationship quality. Although we primarily explored gender, other social categorizations such as 
race/ethnicity or SES (as well as the interactions between social categorizations) may have 
implications for couple financial processes and relational outcomes. Future research should 
explore these phenomena. 
Although there is much to be explored on gender and power as key features of couple 
finance, here are a few questions for future research to address: Does women’s income have 
significant relational impacts for younger generations (who may have more egalitarian cultural 
norms)? Are these findings different for couples who have not been together as long (i.e., was 
there a selection effect in our study)? Are these findings different for lower SES couples? What 
role does relational power play for same-sex couples? What does the discrepancy between 
partner reports of access, management, and conflict mean about a couple’s relationship? Does 
relational power predict couple financial processes? 
Practice Implications 
 In addition to researchers, our study has implications for many other audiences. The 
findings suggest that clinicians (e.g., marriage and family therapists, financial therapists, social 
workers) may want to encourage their clients to use joint bank accounts and manage their money 
jointly. Clinicians should also be aware of the potentially detrimental effects of financial conflict. 
Clinicians may want to assess relational power as an important predictor of relationship quality 
and stability, as well as help couples with an imbalance of power become more egalitarian in 
their financial processes. Educators, such as those teaching pre-marital or marital workshops, can 
use these findings to educate couples on healthy, equitable financial processes. 
Conclusion 
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 Treas (1993, p. 727) said that “family financial practices exist in a context of cultural 
values and societal ideologies.” Gender is a key aspect of these values and ideologies. Thus, 
gender is inseparably tied to mixed-sex couples’ financial processes, particularly through power 
(Dew, 2016). It makes sense that who earns the money, has access to the money, and manages 
the money, as well as how a couple handles financial conflict, are central concerns not only 
financially but also relationally. Yet few studies have used a feminist framework to explore these 
issues. Our study takes a step in that direction, and we hope that explicit discussions of feminist 
assumptions and implications will be more frequently incorporated in future couple finance 
research. As this occurs, issues related to gender in the context of couple finance will become 
more clear, as will pathways for change. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
 Women  Men 
Variables M or n SD or % Range  M or n SD or % Range 
Earners of money 3.56* 2.30 1 – 12  5.92* 2.39 1 – 12 
Access to money .81 .39 0 – 1  .79 .41 0 – 1 
Management of money 2.54 .93 1 – 4  2.56 .97 1 – 4 
Conflict about money 2.85 1.04 1 – 5  2.80 1.00 1 – 5 
Relational power (W2) 3.96* .67 1.67 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
 3.70* .69 1.60 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
Relational power (W3) 4.10* .64 2 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
 3.79* .69 1.60 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
Relationship quality (W2) 4.84 1.09 1 – 6  4.94 .97 1 – 6 
Relationship quality (W3) 4.93 1.13 1 – 6  4.96 1.00 1 – 6 
Relationship quality (W4) 4.80 1.08 1 – 6  4.91 1.01 1 – 6 
Relationship stability (W2) 4.34* .63 1.33 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
 4.42* .60 1 – 5 
Relationship stability (W3) 4.41 .55 1.33 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
 4.44 .52 1.67 – 5 
(1 – 5) 
Relationship stability (W4) 4.31* .61 1 – 5  4.40* .52 2 – 5  
(1 – 5) 
Race (Other) 57 17% 0 – 1  40 12% 0 – 1 
Relationship length (years) 18.31 4.81 1 – 38  -- -- -- 
Note. Range values reflect the empirical range, and if this differs from the theoretical range, the 
theoretical range is given immediately below in parentheses. Paired t-tests were conducted for 
the variables of interest, comparing means between women and men.  
*p < .05. 
  
FEMINISM AND COUPLE FINANCE  42 
 
Table 2 
Select Preliminary Correlations Among Variables 
 Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Earners -- .14* .00 -.27*** .11 .19** .19** 
2. Access .02 -- .13* -.13* .18** .16** .23*** 
3. Management -.02 .05 -- -.11 .33*** .35*** .23*** 
4. Conflict -.03 -.13* -.20*** -- -.41*** -.37*** -.40*** 
5. Power -.04 .15* .25*** -.43*** -- .66*** .59*** 
6. Quality .01 .09 .18** -.30*** .62*** -- .66*** 
7. Stability -.05 .20*** .23*** -.37*** .59*** .69*** -- 
Note. Women’s reports are shown below the diagonal; men’s reports, above the diagonal. 
Relational power was averaged across Waves 2 and 3, whereas relationship quality and 
relationship stability were averaged across Waves 2, 3, and 4. A comprehensive table of bivariate 
correlations can be found in the online supplement (see Table 2s). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
 
Standardized Direct Effects for Relationship Quality Structural Models 
 Cross-sectional Models  Longitudinal Models 
 (a) Non-mediation 
Model 
 
(b) Mediation Model  
(c) Non-mediation 
Model  (d) Mediation Model 
 Female 
Quality 
Wave 2 
Male 
Quality 
Wave 2 
 Female 
Power 
Wave 2 
Male 
Power 
Wave 2 
Female 
Quality 
Wave 2 
Male 
Quality 
Wave 2  
Female 
Quality 
Wave 4 
Male 
Quality 
Wave 4  
Female  
Power 
Wave 3 
Male 
Power 
Wave 3 
Female 
Quality 
Wave 4 
Male 
Quality 
Wave 4 
Female Earners -.01 .03  -.06 .06 -.00 .01  -.04 -.07  .02 .01 -.04 -.07 
Male Earners .10 .13*  .01 .01 .10* .13*  -.03 -.04  -.02 -.05 .01 -.02 
Female Access .04 .17*  .17* .05 -.05 .12  -.01 .02  -.02 -.14* .01 .05 
Male Access .01 -.04  -.05 .01 .03 -.04  .01 .00  -.01 .14* -.03 -.04 
Female Management .09 .18**  .15** .11* -.10 .11*  .05 .13**  -.00 .02 .04 .12* 
Male Management .22*** .25***  .12* .32*** .06 .09  .08 .07  .00 -.06 .07 .06 
Female Conflict -.18* -.03  -.28*** -.02 -.05 .03  -.01 -.02  -.10 -.05 .03 .00 
Male Conflict -.05 -.20**  -.09 -.30*** .09 -.05  .01 -.08  .02 -.06 .05 -.05 
Female Power Wave 2 -- --  -- -- .45*** .18**  -- --  .68*** .03 -- -- 
Male Power Wave 2 -- --  -- -- .30*** .44***  -- --  .09 .73*** -- -- 
Female Power Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  -- --  -- -- .17** .06 
Male Power Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  -- --  -- -- .17** .17* 
Female Quality Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  .49*** .18***  -- -- .41*** .14* 
Male Quality Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  .24*** .53***  -- -- .13 .44*** 
Female Race .09 .03  .09* -.03 .06 .03  .09 .05  -.07 -.06 .12** .07 
Male Race -.09 .16  -.13** -.07 -.01 .07  -.13* -.04  .02 -.02 -.11* -.02 
Relationship length -.06 -.06  -.12* -.07 .02 -.02  -.02 -.01  -.01 .02 -.01 -.01 
Note. The left-hand column represents exogenous variables; the top row of variable names, endogenous variables. Wave 2 = 2008, 
Wave 3 = 2009. Wave 4 = 2010. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
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Table 4 
 
Standardized Direct Effects for Relationship Stability Structural Models 
 Cross-sectional Models  Longitudinal Models 
 (a) Non-mediation 
Model  (b) Mediation Model  
(c) Non-mediation 
Model  (d) Mediation Model 
 Female 
Stability 
Wave 2 
Male 
Stability 
Wave 2  
Female 
Power 
Wave 2 
Male 
Power 
Wave 2 
Female 
Stability 
Wave 2 
Male 
Stability 
Wave 2  
Female 
Stability 
Wave 4 
Male 
Stability 
Wave 4  
Female 
Power 
Wave 3 
Male 
Power 
Wave 3 
Female 
Stability 
Wave 4 
Male 
Stability 
Wave 4 
Female Earners -.05 .01  -.06 .06 -.02 .01  -.07 -.05  .02 .01 -.08 -.055 
Male Earners .11 .09  .00 .01 .13* .10  .05 .04  -.02 -.05 .05 .05 
Female Access .14 .20*  .17* .05 .04 .10  .03 -.05  -.02 -.14* .04 -.05 
Male Access -.02 .01  -.05 .01 -.00 .03  -.02 .08  -.01 .14* -.01 .08 
Female Management .13* .10  .15** .11* .08 .06  -.01 .10*  -.00 .02 .01 .10 
Male Management .14* .17**  .12* .32*** .06 .07  .01 -.00  .01 -.06 .00 -.02 
Female Conflict -.28*** -.07  -.28*** -.02 -.19* .01  -.05 .11  -.10 -.05 -.05 .13 
Male Conflict -.04 -.27***  -.09 -.30*** .08 -.15  .07 -.15*  .02 -.06 .10 -.16 
Female Power Wave 2 -- --  -- -- .47*** .31***  -- --  .68*** .03 -- -- 
Male Power Wave 2 -- --  -- -- .17* .31**  -- --  .09 .73*** -- -- 
Female Power Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  -- --  -- -- .08 .04 
Male Power Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  -- --  -- -- -.08 .05 
Female Stability Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  .71*** .30*  -- -- .55 .33 
Male Stability Wave 3 -- --  -- -- -- --  .18 .57***  -- -- .36 .49 
Female Race -.02 -.03  .09* -.03 -.03 -.03  -.05 -.03  -.07 -.06 -.02 -.03 
Male Race -.04 -.01  -.13** -.07 .00 .03  -.02 -.02  .02 -.02 -.03 -.00 
Relationship length -.01 .03  -.13* -.07 .05 .08  .01 -.00  -.01 .02 .06 -.00 
Note. The left hand column represents exogenous variables; the top row of variable names, endogenous variables. Wave 2 = 2008, 
Wave 3 = 2009, and Wave 4 = 2010. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Significant standardized direct effects of the cross-sectional mediation model 
predicting relationship quality. Control variables (race and relationship length), correlations, 
latent indicators, and non-significant paths are not shown for parsimony. All variables depicted 
represent both women’s and men’s variables. Represented paths are significant at p < .05. FF 
indicates a female independent variable (IV) to female dependent variable (DV) significant path, 
FM indicates a female IV to male DV significant path, MM indicates a male IV to male DV 
significant path, and MF indicates a male IV to female DV significant path. The paths are labeled 
(e.g., 1a) and correspond with pathways described in the Results section. See Table 3 for a 
complete list of direct effects.  
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Figure 2. Significant standardized direct effects of the cross-sectional mediation model 
predicting relationship stability. Control variables (race and relationship length), correlations, 
latent indicators, and non-significant paths are not shown for parsimony. All variables depicted 
represent both women’s and men’s variables. Represented paths are significant at p < .05. FF 
indicates a female independent variable (IV) to female dependent variable (DV) significant path, 
FM indicates a female IV to male DV significant path, MM indicates a male IV to male DV 
significant path, and MF indicates a male IV to female DV significant path. The paths are labeled 
(e.g., 2a) and correspond with pathways described in the Results section. See Table 4 for a 
complete list of direct effects. 
 1 
Online supplement for LeBaron, L., Holmes, E. K., Yorgason, J. B., Hill, J., and Allsop, D. B. 
(2018). Feminism and couple finance: Power as a mediator between financial processes and 
relationship outcomes. Sex Roles. Ashley LeBaron, The University of Arizona. Email: 
lebaronashley@gmail.com 
 
Table 1s 
Items of the Couple Power Scale 
Item Reverse Coded? 
My partner tends to discount my opinion. Y 
My partner does not listen to me. Y 
When I want to talk about a problem in our relationship, my partner often 
refuses to talk with me about it.  Y 
My partner tends to dominate our conversations. Y 
When we do not agree on an issue, my partner gives me the cold shoulder. Y 
I feel free to express my opinion about issues in our relationship. N 
My partner makes decisions that affect our family without talking to me 
first. Y 
My partner and I talk about problems until we both agree on a solution. N 
When it comes to money, my partner’s opinion usually wins out. Y 
I feel like my partner tries to control me. Y 
When it comes to children, my partner’s opinion usually wins out. Y 
It often seems my partner can get away with things in our relationship that 
I can never get away with. Y 
I feel like I have no choice but to do what my partner wants. Y 
My partner has more influence in our relationship than I do. Y 
When disagreements arise in our relationship, my partner’s opinion usually 
wins out. Y 
Note. Y = Yes. N = No. 
 
  
 2 
Table 2s 
Comprehensive Preliminary Correlations Among Variables 
 Correlations 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. F Earners --            
2. M Earners .03 --           
3. F Access .02 .11 --          
4. M Access -.01 .14* .79*** --         
5. F Management -.02 -.07 .05 .04 --        
6. M Management -.04 .00 .09 .13* .24*** --       
7. F Conflict -.03 -.26*** -.13* -.13* -.20*** -.17** --      
8. M Conflict -.13* -.27*** -.11 -.13* -.13* -.11 .65*** --     
9. F Power W2 -.05 .08 .19*** .15** .23*** .21*** -.40*** -.30*** --    
10. M Power W2 .09 .10 .13* .15** .21*** .38*** -.30*** -.39*** .34*** --   
11. F Power W3 -.01 .07 .13* .11* .19*** .19** -.38*** -.28*** .73*** .34*** --  
12. M Power W3 .08 .08 .09 .16** .18** .25*** -.31*** -.38*** .29*** .76*** .39*** -- 
13. F Quality W2 -.01 .15* .12* .11 .17** .27*** -.30*** -.22*** .57*** .46*** .48*** .40*** 
14. M Quality W2 .04 .17** .20*** .17** .27*** .34*** -.28*** -.32*** .40*** .59*** .37*** .52*** 
15. F Quality W3 .04 .16** .07 .06 .16** .22*** -.30*** -.20** .47*** .36*** .49*** .36*** 
16.  M Quality W3 .04 .22*** .14* .11 .19** .26*** -.28*** -.36*** .34*** .50*** .38*** .60*** 
17. F Quality W4 -.00 .10 .07 .07 .18** .25*** -.23*** -.20*** .45*** .41*** .48*** .44*** 
18. M Quality W4 -.02 .10 .12* .10 .30*** .30*** -.30*** -.31*** .38*** .50*** .40*** .55*** 
19. F Stability W2 -.04 .21*** .19*** .16** .24*** .26*** -.40*** -.26*** .58*** .37*** .41*** .34*** 
20. M Stability W2 .04 .19** .24*** .24*** .20*** .27*** -.32*** -.37*** .45*** .48*** .32*** .46*** 
21. F Stability W3 -.02 .16* .20*** .13* .21*** .20*** -.34*** -.21*** .47*** .35*** .52*** .41*** 
22. M Stability W3 .05 .16** .19** .19** .15* .19** -.35*** -.36*** .32*** .47*** .38*** .60*** 
23. F Stability W4 -.07 .17** .20*** .14* .19** .20*** -.32*** -.20*** .47*** .33*** .51*** .43*** 
24. M Stability W4 .00 .17** .18** .18** .25*** .19** -.29*** -.34*** .35*** .45*** .42*** .54*** 
25. Relationship 
length .09 .17** .11* .09 .07 .05 -.11 -.12* -.04 .04 -.02 .07 
 
 
 3 
 Correlations 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13. F Quality W2 --            
14. M Quality W2 .56*** --           
15. F Quality W3 .67*** .44*** --          
16.  M Quality W3 .40*** .65*** .42*** --         
17. F Quality W4 .62*** .49*** .61*** .47*** --        
18. M Quality W4 .44*** .63*** .46*** .67*** .58*** --       
19. F Stability W2 .63*** .55*** .55*** .47*** .51*** .45*** --      
20. M Stability W2 .50*** .59*** .41*** .50*** .40*** .49*** .77*** --     
21. F Stability W3 .58*** .45*** .58*** .46*** .53*** .48*** .83*** .66*** --    
22. M Stability W3 .41*** .52*** .43*** .59*** .41*** .50*** .63*** .82*** .65*** --   
23. F Stability W4 .54*** .46*** .53*** .46*** .61*** .51*** .79*** .65*** .82*** .64*** --  
24. M Stability W4 .48*** .54*** .45*** .53*** .51*** .58*** .61*** .77*** .63*** .78*** .68*** -- 
25. Relationship length .01 .00 -.05 .04 -.02 .00 .06 .08 -.00 .03 .03 .00 
Note. F = female; M = male; W = Wave. Wave 2 = 2008, Wave 3 = 2009, Wave 4 = 2010. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
  
 4 
Table 3s 
Factor Loadings for Latent Constructs 
Indicators Women Men 
Relationship Quality—How much do you agree with this statement?   
We have a good relationship.   
          Wave 2 .95 .94 
          Wave 3 .96 .95 
          Wave 4 .96 .94 
My relationship with my partner is very stable.   
          Wave 2 .94 .92 
          Wave 3 .96 .93 
          Wave 4 .95 .94 
Our relationship is strong.   
          Wave 2 .97 .95 
          Wave 3 .98 .96 
          Wave 4 .97 .96 
My relationship with my partner makes me happy.   
          Wave 2 .94 .92 
          Wave 3 .96 .93 
          Wave 4 .94 .93 
  
 5 
Table 3s (con’t)   
 Women Men 
I really feel like part of a team with my partner.   
          Wave 2 .92 .87 
          Wave 3 .91 .91 
          Wave 4 .87 .92 
Relationship Stability   
How often have you thought your relationship (or marriage) might be 
in trouble? 
  
          Wave 2 .78 .84 
          Wave 3 .76 .78 
          Wave 4 .77 .79 
How often have you and your partner discussed ending your 
relationship (or marriage)? 
  
          Wave 2 .89 .87 
          Wave 3 .87 .81 
          Wave 4 .93 .82 
How often have you broken up or separated and then gotten back 
together? 
  
          Wave 2 .54 .51 
          Wave 3 .61 .46 
          Wave 4 .62 .45 
 
